Co-authored with Jordan Sher
Covid-19 (C19) is wreaking havoc around the world [1]. Unemployment in the US is expected to increase to more than 10% this year, UK’s economy is expected to shrink by 6.5%, and the Chinese economy is expected to experience the slowest growth since 1974 [1]. In South Africa economists predict an economic shrinkage of as much as 13% [2]. And the IMF warns of the risks of an even worse outcome [1].
In [3] Tomas Pueyo presents the analogy of “the hammer and the dance” to describe South Korea’s C19 strategy. The hammer is government’s quick and aggressive action to extinguish the virus. Our government used the hammer too and we don’t challenge this. SA’s lockdown response to the crisis was quick and admirable and limited the otherwise exponential transmission. But, we do challenge the government’s approach to the dance - the balancing of containment, healthcare considerations and the economy.
In this article, we take a behavioural science lens to the South African government’s decision to extend the lockdown from 16 March to 30 April. Was it the right decision? And how can these learnings inform the unlock strategy?
In order to make sense of the lockdown extension, it is useful to understand why an alternative crisis for humankind has not adequately motivated the necessary behavioural changes. In a Harvard Business Review article [4], we read that four aspects of our impending climate change crisis have not triggered us to act:
1. Addressing climate change requires a trade-off between the short-term and the long-term benefits. The short-term prevails for most of us. This also largely explains why people don’t save for retirement.
2. Climate change is a non-linear problem and we struggle to extrapolate non-linearity to understand future impact. Essentially, we don’t have the intuition to make sense of exponential change.
3. The effects of climate change are psychologically distant, in space and in time. The occasional super-storm or wildfire brings it closer, but even those are physically distant from most of us.
4. The future is uncertain. We don’t know for sure how climate change will turn it out – maybe it won’t be so bad, or happen so soon, or maybe we won’t even live to experience the worst of it.
On the flipside, immediate threats that are relatable certainly get our attention and drive our behaviour. For example, if your home is repeatedly broken into, you will most likely invest in enhancing your home security system. Similarly, if your car’s gearbox is faulty and there is a high chance that you will break down on some highway, you will get it replaced as soon as possible. In both examples, the threat is near, probable, and high impact.
If we appreciate these drivers and anti-drivers of behavior change, then we can make sense of government’s response to C19.
1. Ever since the deaths started mounting in China and cases started being confirmed all over the world, including in our country, C19 became an immediate threat.
2. C19 spreads exponentially, not linearly, so arguably we could not fully appreciate the scale of the impact - ask the Americans! Although many governments, including South Africa’s, took the scientific opinion seriously.
3. C19 could hardly be closer to us. Pretty much everyone has an older friend or relative whose life is now threatened and many of us know people who have tested positive or been affected in some way. Further, social media brings the pandemic into our consciousness daily. The availability heuristic plays a role here. Events that are vivid and recent are far more salient to us.
4. While there is uncertainty in the data, the reality is so stark (Iran had to dig mass graves; bodies in Ecuador pile up in streets [5]; Spanish elderly are found dead in their care homes [6]) that we can easily imagine this happening to us, our friends and family, and our fellow citizens.
Given the above, we can see what might have contributed to the decision to extend the lockdown by an additional two weeks. And, continuing with a behavioural science lens, we can see further factors that might have driven the government’s response.
We are susceptible to the “narrative fallacy”, where a coherent story is highly compelling. In fact, coherence trumps correctness and completeness in many cases. We are also highly loss averse, in other words, we fight hard to avoid losses. Plus, once we anchor on an idea, we don’t readily adjust from that position. And, the old favourites of confirmation bias and overconfidence bias play out too. In confirmation bias, amongst the plethora of circulating facts and opinions, we tend to select the ones that support the story we believe, and disregard those that don’t. And we are inherently overconfident of any position we take, believing we are right with more certainty than is justified.
When we throw all of this into the mix, we can see how the government’s decision to extend the lockdown was based on a story about the “clear and present danger” of the pandemic. This story was coherent and evidence-based. Moreover, it motivated for the avoidance of loss (in this case lives). Such a story is/was irresistibly compelling. But, not necessarily correct.
Behavioural science gives us yet further perspectives when we consider the social forces at play.
South Africa’s cases arrived a few weeks later than Europe’s. So, South Africa had the benefit of learning from what others had done. This is good, but it is also potentially bad from a behavioral science perspective. We succumb to groupthink and social proofing. Because other countries are also extending the lockdown, government thinks it must be the right thing to do as well. And, then there are the motivational biases, for example no politician wants to be associated with direct, avoidable deaths. The indirect deaths and morbidity in the future are not as easily attributed to the decision makers.
Behavioural science gives us an explanation for the decision to extend the lockdown to April 30th. We also recognise that the behavioural science lens is not the full explanation of the extension. Of course, flattening the curve and building up healthcare capacity were priorities for government in extinguishing the virus. But it is useful to recognise that we have all of these ingredients from a behavioural science perspective: a compelling, coherent, evidence-based narrative; a narrative that is consistent with the actions of other countries; a narrative that rests on the motivation of saving lives in the face of the looming threat of C19; and a narrative that is “politically correct”.
But, an explanation is not a justification! Was the lockdown extension justified? Despite it having already been decided, the motivation for the lockdown extension is worth examining because lessons from the decision to extend the lockdown could inform the unlocking strategy. Because the behavioural science explanation is so compelling, it suggests that alternative strategies might have been “crowded out”.
When we consider the unlock strategy, we must recognise that “the economy is a public health concern too,” as Professor Danielle Allen, Director of the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University mentioned in her TED interview [7]. This is even more true in our country, where no work equals no pay, which equals no food for millions of starving South Africans. Thus, public health strategies need to consider “all the risks associated with the epidemic, and not only the disease itself” as Alex an de Heever writes in his comprehensive opinion piece [8]. Consult [8] for an in-depth and localised view, as well as BCG’s perspectives [9]. To maximise human flourishing requires, as described in Sam Harris’ podcast [10] and The Economist [11], the uncomfortable, but necessary calculus of putting a price on human life.
Clearly, we cannot rely on lockdown as the principle prevention strategy because the economic consequences are far too dire. The best strategy is only as good as the best alternative considered. So, the unlock strategy, likes all good strategies, should robustly consider a range of alternatives and these alternatives should be evaluated on their prospects of maximizing human flourishing. We are encouraged by the recent announcements of the “risk-adjusted strategy for economic activity” that government is pursuing.
In closing, government faces some hard choices ahead. Lives and livelihoods will be at risk for many months ahead. Clear, objective, holistic reasoning must guide the way, because, when considering alternative paths, we should all be reminded that “sometimes the cure is worse than the disease”.
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